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I. INTRODUCTION
Some prisoners pose a substantial threat of violence when they are
released at the end of their sentence. Many other people present a
genuine danger to the public whether or not they have ever been to
prison. The interesting question is whether there are fair means to
preventively restrain such potentially dangerous agents, especially the
released prisoners who have been previously convicted and thus have
acted on their dangerous propensities.
This Article begins by describing the positive law of preventive detention,
which I term “desert/disease jurisprudence.”1 Then it provides a brief
excursus about risk prediction (estimation), which is at the heart of all
preventive detention practices. Part IV considers whether proposed
expansions of desert jurisprudence are consistent with retributive theories of
justice, which ground desert jurisprudence. I conclude that this is a
circle that cannot be squared. The following Part canvasses expansions
of disease jurisprudence, especially the involuntary civil commitment of
mentally abnormal, sexually violent predators, and the use of post-insanity
acquittal involuntary commitment. This Part also considers whether disease
jurisprudence might justifiably be extended to problematic classes of
agents such as psychopaths. I argue that sexual predator commitments
are blatantly punishment by other means despite the Supreme Court’s
approval of them as forms of civil commitment2 and that other attempts to
expand disease jurisprudence are artificial or unworkable. Next, I
consider frankly consequentialist approaches to preventive detention.
I suggest that they are conceptually coherent but politically and
practically unacceptable. A brief conclusion suggests that the respect for
liberty and autonomy is best guaranteed by genuine desert and disease
limitations on detention, although there will be a cost to public safety.
II. DESERT/DISEASE JURISPRUDENCE
At present, the state’s ability to deprive people of their liberty is
constrained by desert/disease jurisprudence. The state may imprison
people in the criminal justice system if they deserve punishment for
crimes they have committed,3 and it may civilly commit dangerous
1. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY
265, 266, 271–94 (1999) (noting, also, exceptions that may be considered pure preventive
detention).
2. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409, 415 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 364–65, 371 (1997).
3. For the purposes of this Article, the notion of desert I am employing is simply
the traditional retributive conclusion that if an offender’s behavior satisfies the elements
of a charged offense and no justification or excuse obtains, then the offender is culpable
and deserves the ensuing blame and punishment. To avoid confusion, I should add that
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people if they are not responsible agents—usually because they have a
mental abnormality, such as a major mental disorder.4 Otherwise, with
rare, limited exceptions, such as rejecting bail for dangerous agents,5 the
state must leave people at liberty no matter how potentially dangerous
they may be. The concern with justifying and protecting liberty that
produces the desert/disease constraints is deeply rooted in the conception
of rational personhood. Only human beings self-consciously and
intentionally decide how they should live; only human beings have
projects that are essential to living a good life. Only human beings have
expectations of each other and require justification for interference in
each other’s lives that will prevent seeking the good. If liberty is
unjustifiably deprived, a good life is impossible. In sum, both the
criminal and the medical/psychological systems of behavior control
require a justification in addition to public safety—desert for wrongdoing or
nonresponsibility (based on disease)—to justify the extraordinary liberty
infringements that these systems impose.
Virtually all criminals are rational, responsible agents, and according
to the dominant story, the deprivation imposed on them—punishment—
is premised on considerations of desert. No agent should be punished
without desert for wrongdoing, which exists only if the agent culpably
caused or attempted prohibited harm. The threat of punishment for a
culpable violation of the criminal law is itself arguably a form of preventive
infringement on liberty, but it is an ordinary, “base rate” infringement
that requires no special justification. After all, no one has a right to harm
other people unjustifiably. In our society the punishment for virtually all
serious crimes, and thus for dangerous criminals, is incapacitation, which is
preventive during the term of imprisonment. But criminals must actually
have culpably caused or attempted harm to warrant the intervention
of punishment. We cannot detain them unless they deserve it, and desert
requires wrongdoing. In the interest of liberty, we leave potentially
dangerous people free to pursue their projects until they actually offend,
the two generic excusing or nonresponsibility conditions are lack of rational capacity and
lack of control or compulsion. Lack of “free will” and “causation” are not legal excusing
conditions.
4. I have explored the criminal/civil distinction as a basis for confinement
elsewhere and will therefore provide only the briefest sketch here. See generally
Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 113, 116–22 (1996) [hereinafter Morse, Blame and Danger]; Morse, supra note
1, at 266, 269; Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1025 (2002).
5. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741, 755 (1987).
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even if their future wrongdoing is quite certain. We are willing to take
great risks in the name of liberty.
For people who are dangerous because they are disordered or because
they are too young to “know better,” the usual presumption in favor of
maximum liberty yields. Because the agent is not rational or not fully
rational, the person’s choice about how to live demands less respect, and
the person is not morally responsible for his or her dangerousness. The
person can therefore be treated more “objectively,” like the rest of the
world’s dangerous but nonresponsible instrumentalities, ranging from
hurricanes to microbes to wild beasts.6 In brief, agents incapable of
rationality do not actually have to cause or attempt harm to justify
nonpunitive intervention. We can take preemptive precautions, including
broad preventive detention, with nonresponsible agents based on an
estimate of the risk they present. Justified on consequential grounds,
such deprivation will be acceptable if the conditions of deprivation are
both humane and no more stringent than necessary to reduce the risk of
harm. Such deprivations are forms of greater or lesser quarantine and
may include “treatment,” but in theory they are not punishment, and they
should never have a punitive justification or effect.7
In sum, the normative basis of this system of desert/disease
jurisprudence is that it enhances liberty, dignity, and autonomy by
leaving people free to pursue their projects unless they responsibly
commit a crime or unless through no fault of their own they are
nonresponsibly dangerous. Responsible agents are left free on the
theory that a rational agent may always recognize the wrongness and
danger to oneself of criminally infringing the legitimate interests of
others. Therefore, the state may not intervene unless the agent has
attempted or committed a crime. If agents are not responsible for their
danger, then the usual presumptions in favor of liberty and autonomy
yield because they are based on rational agency that is lacking in such
cases.
This is a satisfyingly neat account, but desert/disease jurisprudence
leaves a “gap.” It provides no mechanism to restrain dangerous people
who may not be punished because they have committed no crime or they
have completed their sentence and who may not be civilly committed
because they are responsible agents. The state tries to fill the gap by
6. Such people of course continue to deserve enhanced concern and respect in
virtue of their being human, and they can never be completely objectified.
7. The civil and nonpunitive characterization of such interventions often justifies
lesser procedural protections for the potential subject. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 374–75 (1986) (holding that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against
compelled self-incrimination does not apply in a proceeding to determine whether a
person is a “sexually dangerous person” because the proceeding is not “criminal”).
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expanding desert and disease jurisprudence. For example, desert
jurisprudence is widened by lengthening sentences or by recidivist
sentencing laws. Disease jurisprudence is expanded by widening the
definition of nonresponsibility, most egregiously in sex offender civil
commitment statutes. Both types of expansion are open to substantial
normative and practical problems, however, so the gap inevitably remains.
There is no seamless set of alternative means to preventively detain
dangerous agents. Nonetheless, legislatures continue to try and the courts
usually approve.8
III. AN EXCURSUS ON RISK PREDICTION (ESTIMATION)
However preventive detention is justified theoretically, a crucial
empirical question is how well we can successfully predict whether the
feared behavior will occur.9 The topic of prediction is empirically and
conceptually complex. Covering it adequately is vastly beyond the scope of
this Article and, indeed, is a subject unto itself. I shall therefore address
the major issues briefly, and mostly in conclusory terms, based on my
own experience of three decades of forensic practice and the material
in the accompanying notes. I make no pretense to comprehensiveness
but simply provide sufficient background for the reader to understand
the issues. In later Parts of this Article, I shall simply rely on this Part
unless there is something more specific to be addressed.
Prediction may be performed using clinical (unstructured), semistructured clinical, or actuarial (mechanical) methods.10 In clinical,
unstructured prediction, the risk factors are chosen based on the
clinician’s experience and theoretical commitments, and there is no set
algorithm for how they should be measured or aggregated. In semi8. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14–15, 30 (2003) (upholding enhanced
sentences under California’s three-strikes law).
9. Although many people prefer the term risk estimation, in the remainder of the
Article I shall use the more familiar term prediction.
10. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk
Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39–41 (2011), available at
http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/1/38 (providing an excellent brief introduction to the
various methods and arguing that the choice of a prediction instrument or method should
be based on the purpose of the assessment); John Monahan, Structured Risk Assessment
of Violence, in TEXTBOOK OF VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17, 19–27
(Robert I. Simon & Kenneth Tardiff eds., 2008) (describing the various forms of
assessment in detail and noting that research has not been kind to unstructured violence
risk prediction). These types of prediction may be arrayed along a continuum, but the
text will offer a snapshot summary of each that elides differences.

1081

MORSE POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/3/2012 4:34 PM

structured assessment, the choice of risk factors, and how they should be
combined, is structured, that is, decided ex ante by specific rules. The
clinician has no discretion at this stage, but in generating a final prediction,
the clinician has the discretion to alter the conclusion reached from the
structured components of the prediction using unstructured data not
included in the structured component, such as further interview information.
In structured, actuarial prediction, all three components—choice of
variables, combination of the variables, and the final prediction—are all
structured. In the pure case, the clinician has no discretion whatsoever, a
method that has been both applauded and criticized by commentators.11
All methods that use structure seem equally accurate, which some
attribute to common factors that they are measuring.12 It is impossible to
know the frequency with which the various types of methods are used in
forensic settings in the United States; the literature is “thin.”13
According to the little data available14 and to anecdotal information,
only a minority of predictors use structured assessment methods. Some
states do require the use of semi-structured or structured methods for
certain types of predictions, such as violence among alleged sexual
predators.
Predictions can generate two types of errors: false positives and false
negatives. In the former, it is predicted that the dangerous conduct will
occur, but in fact it will not. This is analogous to convicting the
innocent. In the latter, it is predicted that the dangerous conduct will not
occur, but in fact it will. This is analogous to acquitting the guilty. For
any prediction method applied to any potential group of subjects that is
trying to predict specific outcomes based on methodologically sound
studies, it is possible to generate the rate of each type of error that will
occur in that context. Which type of error is considered costlier is a
normative question. In the criminal justice system, for example, the
prosecution’s burden to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt means that the false positive—convicting the innocent—is the
error we wish to minimize, although it may mean freeing many guilty
and perhaps dangerous defendants.
Two important but difficult accuracy issues are the effect of trying to
predict low base rate behaviors and whether group data can predict the
11. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING
RISK 196, 223, 267 (2d ed. 2006) (applauding the pure, structured prediction method); see
also David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Violence Risk Assessment: Challenging the
Illusion of Certainty, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 147,
149–57 (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011) (criticizing the pure,
structured prediction method).
12. Skeem & Monahan, supra note 10, at 40.
13. Monahan, supra note 10, at 27.
14. Id. at 27–28 & tbl.2-1.
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outcome for an individual member of that group. Low base rate behavior
refers to behavior that is very infrequent in a given population. The
serious violent conduct preventive detention seeks to avoid is typically
low base rate, even among high-risk populations.15 Low base rate behavior
is difficult to predict accurately,16 although more recent methods have
reduced the problem somewhat.17 Indeed, if base rate behavior is quite
low, and the prediction method is not exquisitely sensitive, the prediction
that would generate the fewest total errors would be that no subject is
predicted to be positive on the outcome measure.18
Whether individual behavior can be accurately predicted based on
group data is highly contested.19 Here, in brief, is the problem. Group
data predicts what percentage of the group will meet the outcome criterion,
but legal decisionmakers have to decide the case of the individual person
before them. The actual ex ante risk for the individual is 0 or 1, but we
do not know which it is. The best we can do at present is to estimate the
risk based on the probability for the whole group of which the individual
is a member. Whether we can improve individual predictions is an open
15.
16.

QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 46.
See P AUL E. M EEHL , C LINICAL V ERSUS S TATISTICAL P REDICTION :
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954) (finding that
statistical prediction is more accurate); QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 47. Some of
the problems may stem from the methodology of the studies. For example, using longer
follow-up periods tends to produce higher base rates. Id. But the problem persists if
base rates are low. Id.
17. See Kevin S. Douglas et al., Risk for Criminal Recidivism: The Role of
Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 533, 545 (Christopher J. Patrick ed.,
2006); see also QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 155–96 (describing in detail the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)).
18. With low base rate behavior, predicting that no one will offend will produce
the greatest number of overall accurate predictions. Consider the prediction of future
sexual violence, which is a cornerstone of existing sexual predator commitments.
A recent study of the most widely used instruments for predicting sex offending finds
that they have only moderate success and that these instruments are better at predicting
lack of danger than at predicting danger. Terrence W. Campbell, Predictive Accuracy of
Static-99R and Static-2002R, 3 O PEN A CCESS J. F ORENSIC PSYCHOL. 82 (2011),
http://forensicpsychologyunbound.ws/ (including an excellent review of prediction
technology and the problem of low base rate behavior).
19. Compare Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment
Instruments: Evaluating the ‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions
of Violence, 190 B RIT. J. P SYCHIATRY s60, s60 (2007), available at
http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/190/49/s60.short (noting the inaccuracy of risk evaluations
made by unaided judgment and discussing how actuarial risk assessment instruments
help evaluate risk of future violence), and Cooke & Michie, supra note 11, at 154, 157–
60 (noting that some progress may be possible), with Skeem & Mohanan, supra note 10,
at 40 (describing the question as contested and arguing that group data are useful).
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empirical question. My practical response is that we can and must use
group data although it is admittedly imperfect.20 In any case, there are
certain variables—past history, age, sex, psychopathy—that have substantial
empirical support as risk factors for violent conduct.21
How accurate are violence risk predictions? It is impossible to give an
uncontroversial, uniform answer. Much depends on a study’s methodology,
including the sample and the outcome criterion. I think it is fair to say
that prediction prior to the most recent technology was only modestly
successful, but that the newer techniques have increased accuracy
substantially, especially with high-risk groups and if the outcome
criterion is not terribly low base rate.22 With less high-risk groups, low
base rate behavior, and the use of purely clinical prediction, accuracy is
likely to be poor, and the false positive error of predicting future violent
conduct when it will not occur will be the vastly more common error.
Finally, let us consider two further problems. In all cases of predictions
when there has been extended incarceration in a prison or a hospital, as
time passes, the basis for the prediction would increasingly be the
inmate’s behavior in the institution, but the object of the prediction
would be the agent’s behavior at liberty in the community. The change
in context makes the predictive accuracy even more questionable. Last,
there are substantial gatekeeper concerns in response to predictions.
State officials have little to lose by false positive predictions—keeping
an inmate or patient who would not act dangerously in a prison or a
hospital—and everything to lose by false negatives—releasing early an
inmate or patient who will act dangerously. Gatekeepers, such as
judges, parole boards, and state hospital employees, are conservative
because false negatives tend to be more politically costly even though
they are infrequent. The costs of unnecessary imprisonment of false
positives are not before the public eye, it is uncertain whether these
cases are false positives because they are confined, and the people
affected seldom have much sympathy from the public. On the other
hand, if grave harm is done by a formerly imprisoned or hospitalized
person who has been released although a longer term of incarceration
20. See Skeem & Monahan, supra note 10, at 39–40.
21. See JEREMY F. MILLS ET AL., CLINICIAN’S GUIDE TO VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT
34–39 (2011) (indicating some differences in risk factors between people with and
without mental disorder); Cameron D. Quanbeck & Barbara E. McDermott, Inpatient
Settings, in TEXTBOOK OF VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 10, at
259, 259–60; Skeem & Monahan, supra note 10, at 39–40. See generally QUINSEY ET
AL., supra note 11.
22. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 21, at 65–107 (describing the results from
accuracy studies for a wide range of instruments); QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 39–
41, 155–95 (describing earlier studies and more recent studies using the VRAG—
a purely actuarial method—with various groups of potential offenders).
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was possible, the public is outraged. The incentive structure predisposes
decisionmakers in cases involving danger to overpredict and thus to
imprison or hospitalize longer than is necessary. Even if decisionmakers
tried to do the right thing, after the first hideous, publicized crime
committed by a prisoner or patient released early, decisionmakers would
inevitably become more conservative in their predictions.
IV. EXPANDING DESERT
The three most popular proposals in the United States for restraining
dangerous criminals are expanding the lengths of sentences—including
the use of wide ranges for most crimes of violence—recidivist sentencing
enhancements, and creating new crimes that aim to criminalize dangerous
conduct.23 For the retributivist who believes that desert is a necessary
precondition for punishment and sets a proportionality limit to the
amount of punishment that may be imposed, all three are difficult to
justify.
A. Increasing Sentence Length
For much of the twentieth century, American sentencing schemes
strongly favored indeterminate sentencing with very wide ranges for
most serious crimes. Although in theory and to some degree in practice,
desert set a cap to the permissible ranges, the justification for this
practice was largely a rehabilitation model. Deciding when to release
the prisoner would depend on the professional judgment of the parole
officers concerning the prisoner’s rehabilitation progress. At the maximum
term, the prisoner would of course have to be released even if he or she
had not been rehabilitated and was still dangerous, but the maximum
was typically quite long. Thus, lengthy incapacitation was possible and
many otherwise unrehabilitated prisoners would simply “age out” of
future violent conduct.
Although the indeterminate sentencing model was conceptually coherent,
in practice it was subject to severe problems that led to its demise in
many jurisdictions. First, it led to unprincipled and arbitrary discretion.
Parole officials had virtually unreviewable authority to make release
decisions, but they had neither a coherent conceptual approach to the
issues nor accurate predictive validity about who would be dangerous if
23. For the English experience, see ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 160–97 (3d ed. 2000).
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released. The alleged rehabilitative programs available in the prisons
were either paltry or unvalidated. In a word, the officials were “flying
blind,” and this produced differential treatment that could not possibly
be justified and was widely believed to be racially biased. In addition,
many believed that the sentences actually served in general and the
maximum terms in particular bore insufficient relation to the punishment
that offenders deserved.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the critiques of indeterminate
sentencing reached an unusually bipartisan crescendo. Critics and
politicians from across the political spectrum called for a new regime that
would tie offenders’ punishments to their just deserts, and the legislatures
responded.24 Simultaneously, and in response to concerns about arbitrary
discretion and unjustifiably unequal treatment, legislatures also began to
adopt determinate sentences with relatively limited ranges for most crimes
and sentencing guidelines that limited judicial sentencing discretion to
various degrees. Although the new regime also faces substantial criticisms,
it has been adopted in a considerable number of jurisdictions, including
federal criminal jurisdiction, and it exerts influence on those jurisdictions
that still retain more indeterminate sentencing.
The just deserts/determinate sentencing system lacks the resources
differentially to preventively detain particularly dangerous offenders, but
incapacitation can be achieved simply by increasing the sentences for
serious crimes and ensuring through “truth in sentencing” that few
offenders are released early. Escalating sentence length has indeed been
the American response. Although dangerous offenders are incapacitated for
lengthy terms, the problem is that many nondangerous offenders are
incapacitated as well. This is not an effective means of differentially
incapacitating the most dangerous classes of offenders.
More importantly, many of the authorized prison terms seem
disproportionately harsh, especially compared with prison lengths for the
same crimes in other developed Western nations. I recognize that there
is no proportionality template in the sky, but comparative analysis within
and between jurisdictions—the methodology suggested in Solem v.

24. See, e.g., AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 134–53 (1971); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 69–73, 103–19 (1972); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL S ENTENCING , F AIR AND C ERTAIN P UNISHMENT 19–34
(1976); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION 60–61, 157–63 (1975). There were also proposals to use selective
incapacitation more effectively. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145–61
(First Vintage Books rev. ed. 1985) (1975). This was not coupled, however, with calls
for extensive lengthening of sentences. See, e.g., Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act,
ch. 1139, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5062.
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Helm25—offers a useful approach and provides a principled basis for
arguing that some sentences are simply too harsh. Of course, legislators
have imposed these sentences, and who am I to second-guess the will of
the majority? One can only respond that legislators setting sentences are
motivated by the desire to be tough on crime and to achieve the
consequential goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Even if it is
conceded that these are worthy goals, they may exceed retributively
based proportionality.
B. Recidivist Offender Enhancements
This type of enhancement of detention simply increases a multiple
offender’s sentence beyond the range normally imposed for the crime
based on the offender’s criminal history. Jurisdictions vary substantially
concerning which prior crimes should suffice as a basis for enhancement
and how much enhancement is justified. In principle, this type of penal
program can work effectively to preventively incapacitate a specific,
targeted group of offenders who apparently pose a particular threat to
society. The question for the law, of course, is whether these controversial
enhancements are fair and efficacious. As one commentator says of such
programs generally, there is “no easy way out.”26 Rights and social safety
are inevitably in conflict.
English law, for most of the twentieth century, allowed such
enhancements for offenders deemed especially dangerous, but judges
were loath to impose them because they seemed too much like double
punishment for the same crime.27 Various substitutes for enhancement,
such as increased use of life imprisonment and some limited enhancements,
have resulted since the early 1990s.28 England’s parliamentary system
has ensured that such schemes will be upheld if duly passed by Parliament.
Thus, the politics of the issue are crucial, and there is little sympathy for
repeat, dangerous offenders.
The United States Supreme Court considered on numerous occasions
whether such enhancements violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
25. 463 U.S. 277, 291–92 (1983), overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957 (1991).
26. Richard Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive
Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 387–88 (2008).
27. Anne-Marie McAlinden, Indeterminate Sentences for the Severely Personality
Disordered, 2001 CRIM. L. REV. 108, 109 (2001).
28. Id.
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of cruel and unusual punishments, 29 but there was no clear general
answer until Ewing v. California.30 Ewing considered the constitutionality
of the State of California’s so-called three-strikes-and-you’re-out law,
which imposed a minimum term of twenty-five years for any defendant
convicted of a third felony.31 Defendant Gary Albert Ewing, who was
thirty-six years old, shoplifted three golf clubs worth just over $1000.
He had numerous prior convictions, including one armed robbery that
did not result in an injury, for which he served six years of a nine-year
term in state prison.32 The three-strikes law was imposed, and Ewing
received a sentence of at least twenty-five years, although the felony that
triggered the enhancement, grand larceny, carried a penalty of no more
than one year in either county jail or state prison and most people
convicted of this offense received less.33
A plurality opinion upheld the constitutionality of the law, holding
that the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment was
strictly limited when applied to a legislatively mandated term of years in
prison.34 Only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate violate
the Eighth Amendment, the Court held, and this is to be determined in
light of great deference that should be granted to legislative decisions
about what penal justifications to adopt and about what terms of years
are warranted.35 The Court was unable to fashion a retributive justification
for enhancements but deemed it sufficient that they could easily be
justified on the consequential grounds of general prevention and
incapacitation.36 In short, legislatures are free to impose draconian
enhancements and thus to preventively detain dangerous offenders for
far longer than the triggering offense alone would permit.
Just desert is the moral shoal upon which enhancements founder. By
definition, convicted offenders have already been punished for their
prior offenses as much as the state was willing and able to do so. In
29. Compare, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life
imprisonment with possibility of parole for a three-time offender whose third crime was
larceny of a small amount by false pretenses), with Solem, 463 U.S. at 281–82
(prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a seven-time offender
whose seventh offense was uttering a “no account” check for a small amount of money).
30. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
31. Id. at 26–27.
32. Id. at 18–19.
33. See id. at 19–20.
34. Id. at 30–31.
35. Id. at 23–24 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
36. See id. at 26–27. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, who believes that
constitutional proportionality analysis does not apply at all to terms of years, argued that
proportionality would impose a coherent limit on prison terms only if it was justified
retributively, but he was probably wrong about this. See id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
A consequentially based sentence could be said to be disproportionate if it were longer
than necessary to achieve its consequential goals.
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metaphorical terms, the “slate has been wiped clean” for the prior offenses,
and the triggering offense does not alone warrant the enhancement.
Most criminal justice theorists and commentators in the United States
recognize the important limit desert places on just punishment, so there
have been many attempts to justify recidivist enhancements retributively. It
would go beyond the purposes of this Article to canvas all the attempts.
It suffices to say summarily, however, that there is general agreement
that most of them fail or cannot begin to command a consensus among
criminal law theorists.37 Even those that appear promising, such as R.A.
Duff’s proposal that some courses of criminal conduct indicate such a
complete rejection of respect for society that “banishment” by
enhancements is just38 or the proposals in the other articles in this
Symposium, are highly controversial or undeveloped.
It is especially difficult to justify such enhancements retributively if
one believes that criminal punishment should respond to what the criminal
did and not to who the criminal is.39 Repetitive offending certainly
indicates that the agent has antisocial dispositions and has done far more
than a fair share of criminal harmdoing. Nonetheless, it is not a crime to
have a criminal predisposition or a criminogenic character, and people
do not deserve punishment for their characters.40 Persistent offenders
have received substantially more punishment than less recidivist criminals
for the disproportionate amount of crime the former commit. If the
persistent offenders received lesser sentences for earlier crimes because
they did not have bad records yet or seemed to have reform potential,
that was the state’s decision. Because an offender received less than the
maximum term for a previous crime does not entail that the offender
37. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing Enhancements:
Rationales and Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality Principles
and Social Equality Goals, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL
AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 117, 117–19 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds.,
2010) (concluding that desert-based rationales are unconvincing and unworkable).
38. R.A. Duff, Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING
THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 141, 141–42, 152–56 (Andrew
Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998).
39. Adopting the “whole life” view of desert requires a substantial argument that is
almost never made, especially in the context of whether the criminal justice system can
plausibly justify doing so.
40. A character is a status and presumably cannot be punished. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The literature on the meaning of character is vast
and contested. I take the position that people may deserve moral criticism for their
characters if one believes, as I do, that people must take responsibility for the behaviors
that are supposedly indicative of or constitute their characters.
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should receive more than the current crime deserves. Even if the
unimposed punishment for previous crimes may be coherently said to be
“reserved,” the enhancement could be no more than the reserved desert.
Recidivism does not make the last crime worse or more culpable in
itself than if it had been the agent’s first offense. It simply indicates that
the agent is a worse and more dangerous person, but again, it is not a
punishable crime to be a bad, dangerous agent. Defenders of a retributive
justification for such enhanced punishment schemes are an extremely
rare species precisely because it is so difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to provide an adequate retributive justification for enhanced punishment.41
Although prior conviction does increase the risk of future offending
because past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, present
use of recidivism is too empirically blunderbuss to be fair. For example,
the twenty-five-years-to-life enhanced sentence that Gary Albert Ewing
received was vastly more than could be rationally justified on incapacitative
or deterrent grounds. Now, Ewing was no choir boy. He had a long
history of criminal offenses, and even though his triggering offense was
quite minor, it is legitimate to conclude that he presented a continuing
danger to the public. A lengthy prison term for prior burglary and robbery
had failed specifically to deter him. Apparently, only incapacitation could
prevent him from re-offending, but twenty-five years for a thirty-sixyear-old convict seems unnecessarily long. Although he was not deterred
by the possibility of lengthy sentences, others might well be. Even if some
enhancement were warranted, we have no sensible idea how much. One
might argue that Ewing or others subject to enhancements “assumed the
risk” by offending again while knowing that they were subject to
enhancement, but no citizen should be asked to assume such a risk of
irrational state infliction of pain.
Empirical problems may be solved by research. Increasing knowledge
may allow us accurately to estimate the need for enhanced sentences
based on recidivism and other factors, such as sex and age, that we know
41. See MICHAEL D AVIS , Just Deserts for Recidivists, in TO MAKE THE
PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 121, 129–45
(1992) (noting the scarcity of retributive justifications and offering an account of the
“special advantage” recidivists receive by re-offending). I should add briefly that I do
not believe that recidivist enhancements are consequentially justified even though that is
their best theoretical justification. Additional imprisonment is costly and prevents the
imprisonment of more people unless the state is willing to build more prison cells to hold
all the new offenders who also need to be imprisoned. Also, predictions problems are
substantial. R.A. Duff tries to avoid this problem by claiming that dangerousness is not a
prediction of future conduct but instead a present state assessment of predisposition to
re-offend. Duff, supra note 38, at 152. Thus, there is no genuine actuarial problem. Id.
at 155–56. We do not think a person has a predisposition, however, unless we also think
that there is some substantial probability that it will produce action. If no such
probability exists, we think that there is no predisposition or that it has eroded.
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are related to the risk of re-offending.42 Reliable information may
permit rational enhancement and will decrease the especially worrisome
false positive rate. But it might also lead to extremely lengthy confinement
unless the technology of treatment increased simultaneously and we
were willing to release offenders serving enhanced sentences prior to the
termination of the enhanced term.
In conclusion, recidivist offender enhancements would be, in principle,
effective to incapacitate some undeniably dangerous offenders for lengthy
periods, but these enhancements violate retributive constraints on just
punishment, suffer from empirical problems concerning prediction and
treatment, and are enormously costly. Such programs are politically
popular, but they are not good criminal justice policy.
C. Criminalizing Dangerousness
The third means to enhance the preventive detention of dangerous
agents consistent with retributive desert principles is to criminalize
dangerous propensities. Such proposals must not run afoul of the
prohibition on punishing pure status, which the Supreme Court announced
in Robinson v. California,43 but criminalization can be done indirectly
while still requiring a culpable act or omission. For example, I previously
attempted to provide a retributively sound way to detain dangerous
people. I argued that we could properly criminalize a failure to take the
steps necessary to prevent future danger for agents who were consciously
aware that they posed a grave risk and were aware of the means
necessary to neutralize their danger.44 More recently, Professor Youngjae
Lee made a similar proposal.45 I recognize that there is an argument that
such statutes might be unconstitutional, but given the enormous
deference the Supreme Court grants legislatures’ decisions about how to

42. See John Monahan, A Juisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 414–16 (2006). There is
a strong argument, based on our history of discrimination and negative stereotyping, that
race is the only variable that might have validated predictive validity but nevertheless
should not be used. See id. at 417.
43. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–67.
44. Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 4, at 152–54.
45. Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV.
571, 589–92 (2008).
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define crimes and defenses,46 let us assume for the purpose of argument
that they would be constitutional.
Professors Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch have recently
considered a related proposal that would require a preliminary civil order
that the agent desist from qualifying antisocial behavior that is not
criminal.47 Then, failure to desist following such an order would be a
crime. Adapted to the present discussion, the civil order would require
the potentially dangerous person to take those steps necessary to avoid
the danger.
Although I have raised the possibility of criminalizing dangerous
proclivities as a type of omission, I now believe that such proposals are
unsound on theoretical and practical grounds. These proposals would
vastly expand the reach of the criminal law and would massively intrude
on liberty. Simester and von Hirsch recognize the same objections.48 Such
proposals therefore require powerful justification, especially because
recent general critiques of overcriminalization have been so powerful.49
Criminalizing omissions requires that the agent has a duty not to omit,
but it is questionable to some whether any agent, whether or not
previously convicted of crime, has a legal duty not to offend. Professor
Michael Tonry forcibly argues against such proposals that it is unclear
where the obligation comes from and that no one is obligated not to offend.
Free moral agents may choose to offend or not.50 And every potential
criminal, especially an agent previously convicted and punished, knows
that further crime may similarly be punished. Why should citizens be
further forced into virtue for failure to make the right choices? It is
sufficient to properly punish the primary criminal behavior itself rather
than add a further charge and punishment for the omission.
46. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 55–56 (1996); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977).
47. A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS, AND WRONGS: ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINALISATION 213–14 (2011).
48. Id. at 214–28.
49. See, e.g., D OUGLAS H USAK , O VERCRIMINALIZATION: T HE L IMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 3–4 (2008) (providing a general critical theory); John R. Emshwiller
& Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise, Netting Innocent with Guilty, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2011, at A10.
50. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL
AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 37, at 91, 104. Professor Tonry’s argument may
be too strong. He is correct that free moral agents may choose whether to offend or not,
but that agentic capacity is not necessarily inconsistent with a duty not to offend. If
people have a legal right not to be unjustifiably harmed, then potential harmdoers may
have a correlative legal obligation not to harm. Everyone has a moral duty not to
unjustifiably harm others, but perhaps everyone also has a legal obligation to obey the
law by not violating a criminal prohibition. It is an open question beyond the scope of
this Article whether the criminal prohibition produces obligation independent of the
moral prohibition it instantiates.
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Further, criminalizing this type of omission goes far beyond the bounds
of traditional criminalization of omissions.51 Whether agents have such
a duty is a matter of political and jurisprudential theory. It seems the
burden of persuasion should be on proponents of expanded criminalization
to provide such a defense. I do not do so and believe that any such defense
would be too controversial to ground such an expansion of criminal law.
Professor Lee, whose account is relational, responds that the nature of
associative obligations is grounded only in the existence and nature of
the associative account.52 This is the logical response, but it is far too
controversial to ground massive criminalization.
The amount of preventive detention these crimes would produce might
be scant if retributive proportionality limited the amount of punishment
that could be imposed. How much punishment would be deserved for
conscious failure to take the necessary preventive steps? Compare the
somewhat analogous crime of “reckless endangerment,” which seems
equally if not more culpable and yet typically carries a very limited,
uniform penalty for any risky behavior that passes the threshold.53 One
could define the omission crime to include degrees pegged to the amount
of danger the defendant is aware he or she might create and impose
penalties accordingly. The penalty for failure to take the steps necessary
to prevent homicide or rape, for example, would be far higher than
failure to prevent burglary or assault. Most criminals are versatile,54
however, and it would be difficult to prove that they were aware of the
risk that they would commit crimes they had not committed before.
Even for previously committed crimes, criminals might plausibly claim
that they were certain they would never do that crime again. Determining
precisely what risk the offender was aware of would probably be
unworkable, and penalties would be light based on the one-size-fits-all
general awareness of the risk of committing any further felonies and
failure to take preventive steps.
Determining what the proper preventive steps were and whether the
defendant was aware of them would present further practical problems.
In some cases, this would not be a problem. Pedophilic sex offenders
51.
52.

Id. at 105–06.
Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in PREVIOUS
CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 37,
at 49, 63 n.10.
53. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962) (suggesting a one-year prison sentence).
54. MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 91–
94 (1990).
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know that they should not frequent children’s playgrounds, and prosecutors,
judges, and juries are not likely to believe them if they say they were not
aware. Further, although individual offenders are individually responsible
for their crimes no matter what situational variables may have predisposed
them to offend, most can reasonably claim that those situational variables
are so extensive that it is difficult to know what steps are reasonable. If
the predisposition were linked to an abnormality that could be treated,
then treatment is the necessary preventive step, but that would only
apply for crimes linked to the abnormality. And if the defendant could
not afford the treatment, would not the state have the duty to provide it if
it would be a crime not to obtain it? These sorts of problems, too, render
the proposed crime unworkable.
I conclude that expanding desert jurisprudence to achieve enhanced
preventive detention cannot succeed consistent with reasonably
uncontroversial desert principles. The next Part considers whether
expanding disease jurisprudence would work better.
V. EXPANDING DISEASE
The two major, plausible means to expand disease jurisprudence
would be the allegedly civil but quasi-criminal commitment of certain
classes of dangerous offenders, such as so-called mentally abnormal
sexually violent predators, and the expansion of the number of people
who qualify for the insanity defense and who may be civilly committed
if they succeed. I do not address the expansion of traditional civil
commitment because the modern approach generally limits the length of
commitments55 and because the extremely dangerous classes of people
who are the likely candidates for lengthy preventive detention by expanded
civil commitment are not proper subjects for purely civil commitment.56
This Part begins by describing the classes of agents who most plausibly
qualify for expanded disease jurisprudence in addition to people with
sexual disorders. Then it considers quasi-criminal commitment, concluding
that expanding this method would be constitutional but unwise. Then it
turns to post-insanity acquittal and concludes that in some cases
expanding the disorders that might support an insanity defense may be
55. Samuel Jan Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 21, 72 (Samuel Jan Brakel, John Parry & Barbara A. Weiner
eds., 3d ed. 1985); see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5250, 5300 (West 2010)
(providing that people who are dangerous to others as a result of mental disorders may
be committed for fourteen days but can be detained for an additional 180 days if
necessary). This is hardly a lengthy confinement for a person who may have committed
a serious crime and may still be quite dangerous.
56. Paul S. Appelbaum, Dangerous Severe Personality Disorders: England’s
Experiment in Using Psychiatry for Public Protection, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 397,
398 (2005), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/56/4/397.
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theoretically sound but that it will be practically unworkable to achieve
substantial preventive detention.
A. Three Classes of Offenders
Psychopathy is a condition characterized by emotional traits, such as
lack of empathy, conscience, and concern for others, and by conduct
abnormalities, such as repetitive antisocial behavior.57 A substantial
proportion of convicts serving prison terms have elevated levels of
psychopathy,58 which is a major risk factor for crime.59 Psychopathy is also
a major risk factor for antisocial conduct among those suffering from
other mental disorders.60 There is considerable controversy about whether
psychopathy is a mental disorder, but the dominant position is that it is a
personality disorder and that its signs and symptoms are pathological.
At the least, psychopaths lack psychological attributes that seem central
to successful, cooperative life. At present, psychopaths are considered
criminally responsible, psychopathy is not considered a mitigating
condition for sentencing, and psychopathy is not a sufficient mental
abnormality to qualify for ordinary civil commitment.
Psychopathy must be distinguished from Antisocial Personality Disorder
(APD), which, unlike psychopathy, is a diagnostic category included in
the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s authoritative
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Text Revision
57. The “gold standard” for measuring psychopathy is ROBERT D. HARE,
PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED (2d ed. 2003). An earlier, influential clinical
description is HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (5th ed. 1988). Although
psychopathy is a well-validated diagnostic entity, it is not included in the fourth edition
of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. Psychopathic characteristics can be of greater or lesser severity. My
discussion will assume that a potentially excusable defendant is severely psychopathic.
58. See Thomas A. Widiger, Psychopathy and DSM-IV Psychopathology, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 156, 157–59 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006) (noting that
there is strong overlap between psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD),
but the relation is asymmetric in that APD is more prevalent among prisoners, and
virtually all prisoners who score high on psychopathy meet the criteria for APD, but not
the reverse); Kevin S. Douglas et al., Risk for Criminal Recidivism: The Role of
Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY, supra, at 533, 534 (urging caution on
methodological grounds).
59. Widiger, supra note 58, at 156, 157–59; Douglas et al., supra note 58, at 533,
534.
60. JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR
STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 65–72 (2001); Douglas et al., supra note
17, at 534.
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(DSM-IV-TR).61 All but two of the criteria for APD are repetitive antisocial
behaviors, and neither psychological criterion is necessary to make
the diagnosis. Large numbers of prisoners have APD,62 and there is
substantial overlap with psychopathy. Despite inclusion of APD in
DSM-IV-TR, there is great controversy about whether, as defined, it should
be considered a mental disorder. People with APD are considered
criminally responsible, the disorder is not a basis for mitigation in
sentencing, and the disorder does not qualify for ordinary involuntary
civil commitment.
Some recidivist, dangerous offenders are neither psychopaths nor
suffering from APD. There may be various causes that predispose them
to be at enhanced risk for offending, including genetic or psychological
variables, such as self-control difficulties or genetically caused enzyme
deficiencies that are causally linked to crime.63 Unlike psychopaths or
people with APD, there is no hypothesized mental abnormality that would
justify attribution of a diagnostic category of mental disorder. In short,
this is a diverse category of dangerous but otherwise normal people. Not
surprisingly, there is no question about their criminal responsibility,
mitigation is not warranted unless they also have some independent
mitigating condition, and such people cannot be civilly committed. All
behavior has causes, and causation is not the equivalent of abnormality
or a recognized responsibility-diminishing condition. Therefore, with
limited exceptions, the rest of this Part will be concerned with people
with psychopathy and APD.
B. Quasi-Criminal Commitment
The most plausible disease-jurisprudence means to preventively detain
potentially violent offenders would be by a broad law analogous to the
quasi-criminal commitments of so-called mentally abnormal sexually
violent predators. These laws, unlike commitment of a person following
acquittal by reason of insanity, permit the conviction and punishment of
the person for an offense and potentially indefinite civil confinement
after the prison term has been completed. They are a strange hybrid of
desert/disease jurisprudence, but the ultimate rationale for the commitment
61. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS-TEXT REVISION 701 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
62. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 86.
63. See GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 54, at 85–120 (claiming that lack of
self-control is the predominant psychological cause of crime); see also Avshalom Caspi
et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE
851, 851, 853 (2002) (finding that a genetic abnormality affecting the enzyme MAO-A,
which affects neurotransmitter levels, increases the risk of violence nine times if the
subject was also maltreated in childhood).
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is an expansion of disease jurisprudence. They are apparently the most
promising means under current law to accomplish preventive detention,
so let us consider them in detail to understand how they are justified and
what problems they raise.
Sexual predators fall into the gap between criminal and civil
confinement. They are routinely held fully criminally responsible and
blameworthy for their behavior because they almost always retain
substantial capacity for rationality, they remain entirely in touch with
reality, and they know the applicable moral and legal rules. Consequently,
even if their sexual offending is in part caused by a mental abnormality,
they do not meet the usual standards for an insanity defense.64 For the
same reason, they do not meet the usual nonresponsibility standards for
civil commitment, and they retain the competence to make rational
decisions about treatment. Moreover, as we have seen, in most cases in
which civil commitment is justified, states no longer maintain routine
indefinite involuntary civil commitment but instead tend to limit the
permissible length of commitment.
To fill the gap, Kansas and a substantial minority of other states have
adopted a form of indefinite involuntary civil commitment that applies to
“sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality
disorder.”65 Kansas defined the term sexually violent predator similarly
to other states that have adopted such legislation: “[A]ny person who has
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.”66 In turn,
the term mental abnormality is defined as “a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes
64. Consider the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon of Australia:
[A] great number of people who come into a Criminal Court are abnormal.
They would not be there if they were the normal type of average everyday
people. Many of them are very peculiar in their dispositions and peculiarly
tempered. That is markedly the case in sexual offences. Nevertheless, they are
mentally quite able to appreciate what they are doing and quite able to
appreciate the threatened punishment of the law and the wrongness of their
acts, and they are held in check by the prospect of punishment.
King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182, 187 (Austl.).
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a0l to -29a20 (2005 & Supp. 2010). Kansas
amended its statute after Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), was decided. The
version of the statute considered by the Court, which can be found at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-29a0l to -29a15 (LEXIS through 1994 Legis. Sess.), applied to mentally abnormal
sexual predators.
66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a).
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the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting
such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”67 The statute
did not define the term personality disorder.
The state may impose this form of civil commitment not only when a
person has been charged with or convicted of a sexual offense, but also after
an alleged predator has completed a prison term for precisely the type of
sexually violent conduct that provides part of the basis for commitment.
Commitment is for an indefinite period, and thus potentially for life,
although an annual review of the validity of the commitment is required.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due
process challenge to the constitutionality of the Kansas statute.68 The
majority’s primary rationale was that the Kansas criteria were similar to
civil commitment criteria that the Court had long approved and that the
purpose of the commitment was not punitive.69 The Court emphasized
that legislative judgments were entitled to great deference and that states
were free to use any terminology they wished and did not need to use the
specific nomenclature of any professional group, such as psychiatrists.70
Thus, Kansas was permitted to make mental abnormality, which is not a
recognized diagnostic term in psychiatry or psychology, a predicate for
allegedly civil involuntary commitment. Personality disorder is a traditional
diagnostic category class, but states are free to define this class differently
from psychiatric or psychological standards.
The Court properly looked beyond labels, however, to determine what
potentially justifiable ground for civil commitment the criterion
represented. In this case, civil commitment was justified because the
mental abnormality or personality disorder criterion limited confinement
to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control. The Kansas Act . . . requires a finding of future dangerousness,
and then links that finding to the existence of a “mental abnormality” or
“personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to
control his dangerous behavior. The precommitment requirement of a “mental
abnormality” or “personality disorder” . . . narrows the class of persons eligible
for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.71

Thus, loss of control was apparently the crucial nonresponsibility condition
that triggered the disease jurisprudence justification for the commitments.
Indeed, this was precisely the type of problem allegedly exhibited by
Hendricks, who had a history of multiple convictions for sexual molestation
of children and who described himself as having uncontrollable urges to
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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molest children when he was stressed.72 According to Hendricks, only
death could prevent those urges from occurring.73
In Kansas v. Crane,74 the Supreme Court was asked to decide “[w]hether
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires a State to
prove that a sexually violent predator ‘cannot control’ his criminal sexual
behavior before the State can civilly commit him for residential care and
treatment.”75 Crane thus presented an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to clarify both the nonresponsibility condition that justifies
civil commitment of sexually violent predators and the constitutional
limits on preventive detention.
Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion rejected pure preventive civil
detention based on dangerousness alone and held that substantive due
process required “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” as a
predicate for the civil commitment of mentally abnormal sexual predators.76
Although the Court constitutionalized the lack of control standard, it
rejected the argument that the lack had to be “total or complete” because
such a standard was unworkable.77 The Court reiterated that both the mental
abnormality or personality disorder criterion and the lack of control
criterion were necessary to narrow the class of persons eligible for
confinement.78 These strict eligibility requirements prevent such
commitments from becoming mechanisms for retribution or deterrence,
which are justifications for criminal punishment but not for civil
commitment.79 The Court noted that, in Hendricks, the presence of an
undeniably serious mental disorder that created a “special and serious
lack of ability to control behavior” was crucial to justify the civil nature
of the commitment.80
Defining the quantum of lack of control necessary to justify these onerous
civil commitments thus assumes supreme constitutional importance, but
the Crane opinion provides little guidance. The relevant language is worth
quoting in full:
In recognizing that [lack of control is required], we did not give to the phrase
“lack of control” a particularly narrow or technical meaning. And we recognize
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 355.
Id.
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (No. 00-957).
Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 412–13.

1099

MORSE POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/3/2012 4:34 PM

that in cases where lack of control is at issue, “inability to control behavior” will
not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there
must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when
viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric
diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.81

The Court characterized this language as a description of the inability to
control behavior in a “general sense.”82
The Court recognized that this is not a precise constitutional standard
but asserted that constitutional safeguards of liberty in mental health law
“are not always best enforced through precise bright-line rules.”83 The
Court defended this assertion with two arguments. First, states have
considerable discretion to define the mental abnormalities and personality
disorders that are predicates for civil commitment. Second, psychiatry,
“which informs but does not control [mental health law] determinations,
is . . . ever-advancing,” and its “distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror
those of the law.”84 Consequently, Justice Breyer concluded, the Court
has provided constitutional guidance in the area of mental health law “by
proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally stated
constitutional standards and objectives as specific circumstances require.”85
Finally, the Court implied, but did not decide, that the Constitution does
not require that a serious control problem be caused by a volitional
impairment. The Court suggested that an emotional or cognitive
impairment that caused a sufficient control problem would also pass
constitutional muster.86
To summarize, the disease rationale for these commitments was
furnished by the requirements that the offender suffers from a
personality disorder or “mental abnormality,” that the offender has
serious difficulty controlling himself or herself, and that the mental
impairment must “cause” the person to have serious control difficulty.
As a result of these three requirements, the offender is allegedly not fully
responsible for sexually violent conduct and comes squarely within the
realm of disease jurisprudence.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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C. Expansion of Sexual Predator Commitments to Violent Offenders
To see why this form of commitment is a potentially promising model
for the preventive detention of our two classes of offenders, imagine the
following changes to the definitions of predator and of mental abnormality.
Recall that the Court indicated that it would be very deferential to
legislative judgments in this area. Assume that the legislature has
announced, as the Kansas legislature did about sexual predators, that
people with psychopathy and APD—classes of dangerous offenders with
a recognized disorder—create a very acute need for social protection, which
requires special legislation. Then, it defines dangerous predator and
mental abnormality as follows, in each case using the definitions in
sexual predator legislation,87 but simply removing any reference to sex
and retaining references to violence:
Any person who has been convicted of or charged with a violent offense and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in repeat acts of violence.
A congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity that predisposes the person to commit violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.

In principle, the new statute could cover all three classes of offenders,
including offenders with no officially recognized mental disorder. There
would be no trouble concluding that most within each class suffer from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder.88 The only question would
be whether they have serious difficulty controlling themselves or some
other emotional or cognitive impairment resulting from the mental
abnormality or personality disorder.
There are grave difficulties, however, with every aspect of sexual
predator commitments that would apply equally to any extension of
87. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2005 & Supp. 2010).
88. Although Justice Breyer’s partial concurrence in Hendricks approved Kansas’s
definition of mental abnormality, he did note that he was concurring only because he
believed that the sex offender would have to suffer from a recognized abnormality. See
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the case
of Hendricks, the abnormality was pedophilia, a recognized paraphilia according to
DSM-IV-TR. See id. at 375 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 61, at 524–25, 527–28).
Nonetheless, the Hendricks majority never imposed any such limitation, and the Court
has not done so since. Thus, many apparently normal dangerous offenders might be
diagnosed with personality disorders or a mental abnormality. And, as I argue immediately
below, the mental abnormality definition the Court approved in fact applies to all offenders
and, indeed, to all people.
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commitment to dangerous offenders more generally. They employ (1) a
problematic differential responsibility standard compared with criminal
responsibility, (2) an empty mental abnormality definition, and (3) a
vague, unoperationalized nonresponsibility criterion.
The state can of course adopt different responsibility standards in
different contexts. When indefinite confinement is at stake, however,
the state has a heavy duty to justify the lesser standard for nonresponsibility,
which is the foundation for indefinite commitment. Should not the state
be more “forgiving” when it is blaming and punishing for crime than
when it is imposing involuntary commitment on people who, at the
moment, cannot be punished for any offense? No state or commentator
has yet provided an adequate justification for the distinction. If potential
predators are insufficiently responsible to be left at liberty until they
commit another offense, why should they be held criminally responsible
for such an offense in the first place? After all, offenders held responsible
enough to warrant fully the state’s most severe infliction—the imposition of
criminal blame and punishment—are now being committed at the end of
a prison term justified by desert because they allegedly are not
responsible for precisely the same type of behavior for which they were
convicted and punished.
Assuming that there is an adequate justification for the criminal/civil
responsibility differences, there are problems with all three criteria that
support the disease justification. The justifiable purpose of the personality
disorder and mental abnormality criterion in sexual predator statutes is to
identify those dangerous offenders who are not responsible, but neither
“disease” criterion will serve the purpose.
Personality disorder is a recognized category of psychiatric diagnoses,
but people with personality disorders rarely suffer on that basis alone
from the types of psychotic cognition or extremely severe mood problems
that are the standard touchstones of a finding of nonresponsibility.89
Most are perfectly in touch with reality, their instrumental rationality is
intact, and they have adequate knowledge of the applicable moral and
legal rules that apply to their conduct.90 Although their abnormalities
might make it harder for them to behave well, they seldom manifest the
grave problems that might satisfy an insanity defense or even warrant a
commonsense excuse on the ground that they cannot “help” themselves.
89. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 61, at 685, 688–89.
90. In many cases, the conduct that is the basis for the diagnosis does not per se
cause the person distress. For example, an agent whose conduct warrants the diagnosis
of APD may be distressed by the reactions of the police, creditors, and others, but the
conduct itself might not be distressing. See id. at 702–03. Moreover, the degree of
distress or impairment such disorders cause is very much a function of the particular
social, moral, and legal regime in which the person lives, which once again suggests the
highly value-relative nature of the judgment of disorder in these cases.
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Even if interpreted to exclude less severe defects, the term would still be
overinclusive as a predicate for genuine nonresponsibility in the case of
most people who fit within our three classes of violent offenders.
Mental abnormality, as Kansas defines it, may be constitutionally
acceptable after Hendricks, but it cannot possibly satisfy the
nonresponsibility condition because it would apply to every person who
is potentially violent, whether or not the person’s conduct warranted a
recognized diagnosis or a finding of any psychological abnormality
whatsoever. The mental abnormality criterion is obscure, circular, and
mostly incoherent. The definition states that a person is abnormal if any
genetically inherited or prenatally acquired (congenital) or environmental
(acquired-through-life-experience) variable that affects the person’s
emotional or volitional ability predisposes the person to engage in violent
crime. It is not clear what is meant by “emotional” or “volitional” ability.
Neither word is a term of art or a technical term in the behavioral or
philosophical literature. The former has a commonsense, intuitive
meaning. In contrast, the concept of volition is extraordinarily vexed.91
If it refers to the ability of agents to execute their intentions, no offender
who successfully executes an intention to offend suffers from any volitional
disability.92 If it refers to states of desiring or wanting, it is redundant
with the requirement of a “predisposition” to criminal violence.
Predisposing cognitive variables were evidently excluded from Kansas’s
definition probably because cognitive problems are rarely factors in sexual
abnormalities. Hendricks appears to recognize, however, the possibility
that cognitive impairments would suffice, and a statute could be rewritten or
interpreted to include them. If a cognitive factor were included and did
seem relevant, as in the case of manifest delusions about what the
offender was doing, standard nonresponsibility conditions, such as gross
irrationality, would obtain.
Assume that we have a clear understanding of the meaning of emotional,
volitional, and cognitive abilities. What else would predispose any agent
to any conduct—criminal and noncriminal, normal and abnormal—if not
biological and environmental variables that affect the agent’s emotional,
91. The meaning of volition is controversial in philosophy and psychology. See
MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113–65 (1993) (providing the most extensive discussion of volition
in legal literature, criticizing the view that volitions are desires, and arguing that a
volition is an intention to execute a basic action).
92. See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 61 (1979).
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volitional, and cognitive abilities? In other words, the definition is
simply a partial, generic description of the causation of all behavior, and
it is not a limiting definition of abnormality. All behavior is caused by
emotional, volitional, and cognitive abilities that have themselves been
caused by congenital and acquired characteristics. The conditions that make
violent predators mentally abnormal—congenital or acquired causes of a
predisposition—apply to all behavior, and the definition is thus vacuous.
It certainly cannot explain why the inevitable presence of congenital and
acquired causes of a predisposition means that the agent cannot control
and is not responsible for action that expresses the predisposition. Indeed,
according to this criterion, no one would ever be responsible for any
conduct.
To limit the definition to violent predators, the hypothesized revised
criterion is entirely dependent on the requirement of a specific
predisposition to commit violent offenses, but it is not a definition of
mental abnormality even in the case of violent people. If any agent who
has a predisposition to commit violent offenses is mentally abnormal, as
the revised definition implies, then the definition of the term mental
abnormality is circular, and abnormality does not independently provide
even part of the necessary causal link. The definition presupposes what
it is trying to explain. Moreover, such a circular definition collapses the
clichéd, but important, distinction between “badness” and “madness,”
which is precisely the distinction the definition is meant to achieve to
justify civil, rather than criminal, commitment.
Despite the glaring flaws in this crucial criterion for the disease
justification, the Supreme Court has upheld its constitutionality. Let us
therefore see how it might apply to our three classes of offenders. The
emotional predisposing capacities might straightforwardly describe
abnormalities psychopaths exhibit. One reason they may be predisposed
to crime is that they have no concern or empathy, which can plausibly be
construed as emotional capacities. If cognitive capacities are considered, it
is clear that psychopaths are not psychotically out of touch with reality.
But if one were to interpret their empathy and conscience impairments
as producing cognitive impairments in their practical reasoning about
rights infringements, then the conclusion that a cognitive abnormality is
present might be warranted. Note again, however, that this interpretation
would be inconsistent with criminal responsibility standards. Moreover,
it is not clear that people with APD and other dangerous offenders have
such emotional and cognitive impairments, but the emptiness of the
definition would probably permit diagnosing these people as suffering
from mental abnormality.
Recall that a criterion for these commitments is that there must be a
causal link between the mental impairment and serious difficulty
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controlling oneself or some other nonresponsibility condition. When
mental abnormality is causally related to legally relevant behavior, such
as violent future conduct, two effects are possible: the abnormality may
simply play a predisposing causal role, and the abnormality may
undermine the agent’s responsibility for the legally relevant behavior.
Consider first how a mental abnormality may operate as a predisposing
cause of behavior. A mental abnormality does not cause legally relevant
bodily movements to become mere biophysical mechanisms, such as a
neuromuscular spasm. Abnormal thoughts, desires, perceptions, and the
like are not simply irresistible mechanical causes of further conduct,
even if, ultimately, biophysical explanations can be given for them—and
for normal thoughts, desires, and perceptions. Rather, such abnormalities
create irrational reasons for action or compromise the agent’s general
capacity for rationality or self-control. A mental abnormality thus
sometimes plays a causal role by affecting the agent’s practical reasoning
that leads to the legally relevant behavior. If such irrationality had not
existed, the legally relevant behavior would have been less likely to
occur. A mental abnormality is not a necessary cause of legally relevant
behavior—and it is virtually never sufficient—but it may be a strongly
predisposing cause. As we have seen, however, mental abnormalities that
impair cognition are likely to play this role only for psychopaths among
our three classes of offenders if the defects of psychopaths are interpreted to
satisfy the cognitive impairment criterion. Consequently, the “serious
difficulty controlling oneself” criterion may assume the paramount role
for the other two classes and perhaps for psychopathy as well.
Lack of self-control was at the heart of the disease justification for
quasi-criminal commitment in Hendricks and Crane, so it is crucial to
understand what it means and how successfully we can assess it. The
rationale for an independent control test is that some agents allegedly do
not have rationality defects and therefore cannot satisfy cognitive tests,
but they nonetheless cannot control their conduct and therefore are not
responsible for the behavior they cannot control. The question for quasicriminal commitment law is whether an independent control test for
excuse or mitigation is conceptually sound and practically feasible.
I suggest that, at present, control tests are poorly conceptualized and cannot
be adequately assessed. Thus, they are poor predicates for disease
jurisprudence within any doctrine, including the insanity defense,
and not just for quasi-criminal commitment.
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Four false starts or distractions bedevil clear thinking about control
tests: (1) the belief that allegedly uncontrollable behavior is not action,
(2) the belief that behavior must be out of control if it is a sign or
symptom of a disease, (3) the belief that the metaphysical argument
about free will and responsibility has any relevance to the criminal law
problem of whether a control test is necessary, and (4) the belief that
causation at any level of causal explanation, including abnormal causation,
is per se an excusing condition or the equivalent of compulsion.
Control test cases uniformly involve human action and not mechanism.
If the agent’s conduct is a literal mechanism, such as a reflex, or if it is
performed in a state of substantially clouded or dissociated consciousness,
then the defendant does not act at all and there is no need for a control
test. The legally relevant behavior in cases in which a control test seems
necessary, such as seeking and using drugs or intentional sexual contact
with a minor, is allegedly the sign of a disease, but that does not mean
that the defendant is not acting. Seeking and using drugs and intentionally
molesting children are quintessentially intentional human actions and at
least potentially subject to the control of reason.
Conduct is not per se out of control simply because it is the sign or
symptom of an alleged disorder. Most signs and symptoms of diseases
are literally mechanisms and not human action. Once the disease process
begins, one cannot stop it immediately only by intentionally deciding to
end it. In contrast, the signs and symptoms for which a control test is
allegedly necessary are per se human actions, and simply refraining from
acting in the objectionable way is sufficient to end the sign of the disease.
If actions that are signs and symptoms of a disease are to be excused
because they are involuntary, involuntariness or compulsion must be
independently demonstrated to avoid begging the question.93
Control tests have nothing to do with free will understood as contracausal freedom or agent origination. All criminal law responsibility
doctrines are compatible with the truth of determinism.94 Control problems
must be demonstrated independent of the external metaphysical debate
about free will and responsibility because doctrines of excuse are
internal to law. Moreover, if some behavior is randomly caused or is the
product of causal indeterminacy, such causation would not be a secure
foundation for responsibility or nonresponsibility. Even if it were, there
is no reason to believe that random or indeterminate causation plays a
greater role in supposed control test cases.

93. Id. at 148–53.
94. See Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry
and Psychology, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 203, 203 (2007).
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Causation of behavior is not per se an excusing condition, and it is not
the equivalent of compulsion or involuntariness. To believe otherwise is
to make the “fundamental psycholegal error.”95 In a causal universe that
is massively regular, that satisfies what philosopher Galen Strawson
terms the “realism constraint,” all behavior is presumably caused by
necessary and sufficient conditions.96 If causation were per se an excuse
or the equivalent of compulsion, then no one could ever be responsible
for any behavior. Causation is not the equivalent of compulsion because
the nonliteral compulsion that control tests address is normative. It
applies only to some defendants. All behavior is caused, but only some
behavior is compelled. The external critique of all responsibility practices
based on universal causation does not explain or improve understanding
of positive law.
Even if the causal process is considered “abnormal,” it does not follow
that the caused behavior cannot be controlled. For example, the dominant
biological theory of addiction hypothesizes that persistent use of
rewarding substances usurps the brain’s normal mechanisms of reward.97
Even so, lack of control must be proved independently by showing how
this account indicates lack of control.98
Lack of control must be explained and understood in the terms of folk
psychology. Folk psychology refers to the theory of explaining behavior
that treats mental states, such as desires, beliefs, intentions, plans, and
reasons, as genuinely causal and that treats people as agents who can
potentially be guided by reason and are potentially reasons responsive.99
It is the law’s implicit theory of action because all legal criteria
presuppose folk psychology. Evidence concerning action, disease or
disorder mechanisms, and causation may be relevant to the proof of
whether a control problem exists, but the definition of and the criteria for
a control problem must be folk psychological. To claim that folk
95. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592–94
(1994).
96. Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism,
32 INQUIRY 3, 12 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
97. See Steven E. Hyman, The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for
Voluntary Control of Behavior, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8 (2007), available at http://
bioethics.net/journal/j_articles.php?aid=1108.
98. See FINGARETTE & FINGARETTE HASSE, supra note 92, at 148–53.
99. See Terence Horgan & James Woodward, Folk Psychology Is Here To Stay, 94
PHIL. REV. 197, 197 (1985); Katrina L. Sifferd, In Defense of the Use of Commonsense
Psychology in the Criminal Law, 25 LAW & PHIL. 571, 571 (2006). Mental states are
only partial causes, but they are a crucial part of the causal explanation for intentional
behavior.
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psychology is “wrong” or unscientific is an external attack on all current
conceptions of law. Such critiques should be addressed directly and
should not be smuggled in partially through a control test.
I suggest that an adequate, independent folk psychological account of
loss of control must fulfill at least five criteria. First, it must be a capacity
account. Otherwise, simple failure to exercise the self-control capacity
that the agent possesses would be sufficient for excuse, which would be
a morally and legally indefensible result. Second, the account must be
distinguishable from weakness of will, which is considered a moral
failure. Drawing this distinction will be difficult because the definition of
weakness of will is fraught. Third, loss of control must be a continuum
capacity. It is virtually inconceivable that control capacity would be allor-none. Fourth, the capacity should be applicable in an ordinary
environment broadly conceived. Agents’ ability to restrain themselves
under extraordinary restraining influences does not entail that they can
control themselves under ordinary circumstances. Fifth, the criteria must
be folk psychological because the law is resolutely folk psychological.
Virtually all proposed loss of control theories already meet most of these
criteria, except perhaps the second and last. Finally, a nonconceptual
criterion would be that the capacity must be practically subject to
reasonably objective evaluation.
Let us begin with the phenomenology. Suppose that a person has a
powerful desire to do something that is unwise, immoral, or illegal. That
is, the agent really, really, really wants to do something wrong, such as
violently attack another. Desires, whether “normal” or “abnormal,” may
be strong or weak, persistent or sudden. It is of course easier, in the
colloquial sense, to behave wisely, morally, and legally if an agent does
not have suddenly arising, strong desires to do something wrong.
Moreover, failure to satisfy strong desires can cause very unpleasant
feelings, such as tension and anxiety. The agent’s instrumental practical
reason may seem unimpaired when powerful desires arise, and virtually
all agents who yield to strong and even sudden or surprising desires to
behave unwisely, immorally, or illegally fully recognize that yielding is
wrong. What does it mean to say that an agent “can’t help it” when the
agent yields?
Scientific discoveries about behavior often furnish mechanistic causes,
but the problem of control remains. Causation per se, at any level of
causation and whether or not it is “normal,” is not an excusing condition
or the equivalent of compulsion. Humans clearly have “stop” folk
psychological processes—techniques that they have developed and apply
consciously and unconsciously to achieve self-command in the face of
temptation—that are influenced by mechanistic causes. Successful human
interaction would otherwise be impossible. Nevertheless, we still need
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an adequate, independent folk psychological account of why psychopaths or
other dangerous offenders have trouble controlling themselves.
A common approach is to conceive of loss of control as motivational
compulsion—as occurring when a desire has too much motivational
force to be resisted under ordinary circumstances. The analogy is to
overwhelming physical force, but rather than being compelled by external
force majeure, agents are compelled by their own “overpowering” desires.
Some desires are stronger than others, but desires are not like external
physical forces that physically overwhelm the agent’s ability to resist. If
this were true, the claim would be no action. The agent who loses
control nonetheless acts.
There are no “forces” of desire. Physical forces can bypass intentionality
and assent; desires cannot.100 It is more likely that strong desires redirect
rather than bypass intentionality. Resisting a desire causes the agent so
much effort and discomfort that resisting is not worth the effort, even
though it is possible, so the agent collaborates with the desire. The
“forces of desire” account also fails to distinguish among different
strong desires because all strong desires would appear to be sources of
loss of control. Focusing on “abnormal” desires will not solve the
problem because “normal” desires may be equally strong and abnormal
desires may be weak. Moreover, once the desire is considered resistible
with effort, how is this case different from weakness of will? The
motivational compulsion account of loss of control leaves all the
important issues unresolved.
Another theory hypothesizes that compulsion arises from a conflict
between first-order desires—what the agent wants to do now—and
second-order desires—the desires that agents reflectively have about
what they should want.101 Conflict between first- and second-order desires
may make it more difficult to avoid acting on one’s first-order desires,
100. Gary Watson, Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence, in
ADDICTION: ENTRIES AND EXITS 3, 6–7 (Jon Elster ed., 1999).
101. This influential account was first developed by the eminent philosopher Harry
Frankfurt. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,
in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 11, 11–12, 24 (1988) (claiming that “[a]
person’s will is free only if he is free to have the [kind of] will he wants”). It by no
means commands universal assent, however. See ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN
ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-DECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL 73–74 (1987) (rejecting
hierarchical accounts because they do not resolve the problem of self-control); Gary
Watson, Free Action and Free Will, 96 MIND 145, 149–51 (1987). These accounts have
spawned an industry of criticism. See, e.g., ROBERT KANE, A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION
TO FREE WILL 85 (2005).
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but this theory has weaknesses, and why it is a theory of compulsion is
unclear. The observation that an agent is in conflict does not mean that
the agent cannot control his or her conduct, unless there is an account of
why that conflict produces lack of control.
A promising approach to control difficulty is based on “reasons
responsiveness.”102 If agents cannot be persuaded, actually or hypothetically,
by good reasons to avoid acting, or if they cannot bring those reasons to
bear, then the agents probably cannot control themselves.103 The reasons
must be ordinary reasons or the criteria would be too demanding. A gun
at the head would constitute an extraordinary reason. If the agents can
control themselves in such circumstances, it would not follow that the
agents could control themselves in ordinary circumstances.
Although this account is subject to objections and difficulty
distinguishing weakness of will, it is intuitively appealing because it
does not suffer from the failed analogy to physical force and because it
provides a commonsense folk psychological process for loss of control.
Nonetheless, to the extent it is valid, it is a rationality account. The
capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason is the heart of normative
rationality. Once again, this might be an attractive characterization of
the deficits that psychopaths have.
A final theory for an independent self-control failure is the analogy to
the two-party excuse of duress, but we do not excuse in duress cases
because the agent had a volitional or control problem. The agent’s
reasoning is intact, and her will operated effectively to save her from the
threat. We excuse the agent because she faced a dreadfully hard choice
for which she is not responsible, and we could not fairly expect her not
to yield. According to this analogical theory of loss of control, the agent
faced with the threat of frustration of strong internal desires is essentially
claiming an “internal duress” excuse. Such accounts may seem
plausible for “disorders of desire,” such as addiction and the paraphilias,
but it does not seem applicable to psychopaths and the other types of
offenders under consideration in this Part.
Proponents of an independent control test have not yet provided a
persuasive folk psychological account independent of a rationality problem.
In addition, control tests suffer from the defect that I have termed the
“lure of mechanism,” the tendency to analogize allegedly out-of-control
102. See generally JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND
CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1–91 (1998) (providing a theory of
responsibility based on responsiveness to reasons).
103. In one of the earliest attempts to propose a control test, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen recognized that the inability to be guided by future consequences, that is, by
good reasons, was the primary source of failures of self-control. It is essentially a
cognitive test despite being labeled a control test. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 170 (1883).
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agents to literal mechanisms.104 Sophisticated proponents do not do this,
but many academic lawyers, practitioners, and mental health experts do.
The usual basis is the mistaken belief that if behavior is caused, the
agent could not have acted otherwise. Control tests inadvertently fuel
this pernicious problem because they mask the difference between the
folk psychological sense of loss of control and the metaphysical question
of whether determinism or universal causation undermines all deontological
responsibility.
Control tests also raise difficult practical problems. The American Bar
Association and the American Psychiatric Association both supported the
movement to abolish control tests for legal insanity on the ground that it
was impossible to evaluate lack of control objectively.105 Recall that in
Crane, Justice Breyer provided a typically thin and seemingly
commonsense test:
[W]e did not give to the phrase “lack of control” a particularly narrow or
technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at
issue, “inability to control behavior” will not be demonstrable with
mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.106

It would have been hard for Justice Breyer to do better because there is
essentially nothing to say that is not conclusory or circular. There is no
consensual scientific definition or measure of lack of control. Nor is
there yet an adequate folk psychological process that has been identified
as normatively justifiable for legal purposes.
Justice Breyer’s vague and unhelpful “serious difficulty” control criterion
was the wrong test. How would a factfinder know if the defendant had
serious difficulty controlling himself or herself except on the bases
of the defendant’s self-report and observations of the defendant’s
seemingly self-destructive conduct? Justice Scalia’s dissent observed
that the test would give trial judges “not a clue” about how to charge
juries.107 Justice Scalia speculated that the majority offered no further
elaboration because “elaboration which passes the laugh test is

104.
105.

Morse, supra note 95, at 1590–92.
C RIMINAL J USTICE S TANDARDS C OMM ., A M. B AR A SS ’ N , ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 cmt., at 340–42 (1989); Insanity Def.
Work Grp., American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983).
106. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
107. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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impossible.”108 Justice Scalia wondered whether the test was a quantitative
measure of loss of control capacity or of how frequently the inability
to control arises. 109 In the alternative, he questioned whether the
standard was adverbial, a descriptive characterization of the inability to
control one’s penchant for sexual violence.110 The adverbs he used as
examples were appreciably, moderately, substantially, and almost totally.111
Justice Scalia’s commonsense criticism of the test was apt. To date,
advocates of an independent control test have not demonstrated the
ability to identify “can’t” versus “won’t.”
Although we do talk colloquially about and appear to have an
everyday understanding of loss of control, we do not, in fact, have a
good understanding. Moreover, successful human interaction does not
depend on successfully assessing control capacity. Even when we
appear to be making commonsense, ordinary judgments of lack of selfcontrol, the psychological process is unspecified. If it were analyzed,
rationality impairments would appear. And as H.L.A. Hart recognized
long ago, it is much easier to assess rationality defects than control
defects.112
In most cases of alleged “loss of control,” agents raise claims that, for
some reason, they could not “think straight” or bring reason to bear. The
“control” language used in Crane and in other cases and statutes is
metaphorical and better understood in terms of rationality defects. Human
beings control themselves by using their reason. “Stop” mechanisms are
primarily cognitive. If agents cannot use their reason, it is difficult to
behave properly and it explains why some people seem “out of control.”
I suggest that this is the best understanding of why psychopaths may
have difficulty “controlling themselves”: they do not have access to
empathy, concern, and conscience that give agents the normatively best
and empirically most motivating reasons not to harm others.
The mental abnormality, causal link, and serious control difficulty
criteria are not adequate nonresponsibility standards. They cannot
conceivably limit quasi-criminal commitment to only those mentally
abnormal potentially violent predators who cannot control themselves
and thus are not responsible for their potential violence. Using such

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
See id. at 423–24.
Id. at 424.
Id.
H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM
IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 95, 99 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958), reprinted in H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 33 (1st
ed. 1968).
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criteria, virtually every violent offender would be both convictable and
committable. This would be unjust.
Even if we could limit the class of offenders who somehow properly
met the quasi-criminal commitment criteria, we would still have the
problems of prediction and treatment that all preventive detention
justifications present. Although psychopathy is a serious risk factor for
crime and enhances the probability of recidivism, there will still be large
numbers of false positives, adequate treatments will still not exist,113 and
gatekeepers will still tend to be conservative. The result will be lengthy
and often life-long commitments for people who might otherwise be
released earlier and lengthy commitments for some offenders who might
not be dangerous at all. And unlike recidivist enhancements, which
suffer from the same defects but are at least based on intentional wrongs
for which the offender is culpable, the ground for preventive detention in
this case—psychopathy or some other disease criterion—is a disorder,
an attribute of the person for which the offender is not responsible.
Many violent offenders committed quasi-criminally might spend the rest
of their lives unnecessarily in institutions at immense cost to them
personally and at immense fiscal and moral cost to society.
D. Traditional Insanity Acquittal Followed by Commitment
Legal insanity is the only current American doctrine that instantiates
an excuse for adults for lack of rational or control capacity.114 The most
common is a “cognitive test,” which adopts some variant of the
traditional English rule derived from M’Naghten’s Case.115 That test
holds that people will be excused if they were acting under such a defect
of reason arising from disease of the mind that (1) they did not know the
nature and quality of the act that they were doing, or (2) if they did know
it, they did not know that what they were doing was wrong.116 A minority
of American jurisdictions have adopted a “control” test in addition to a
cognitive test.117 These tests excuse if, as a result of mental disorder, the
defendant was acting under an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse or
113. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 269 (asserting that there is no treatment for
psychopathy).
114. Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 4, at 129–30.
115. [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.). For a complete description of the tests in use
in the United States, see Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006), which provides
a description of the various rules and the number of jurisdictions that have adopted each.
116. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719, 722.
117. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 751.
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had lost the ability to choose the right conduct.118 No jurisdiction has
adopted a control test as its sole test for legal insanity.119 A minority of
jurisdictions have adopted the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code test, which includes both a cognitive and a control test.120 It
excuses defendants if, as a result of mental disease or defect, they lack
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality—or in the
alternative, the wrongfulness—of their conduct or to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law.121
Cognitive tests provide a distinct folk psychological mechanism for
excuse or mitigation, including the inability to attend to the proper
considerations for guiding conduct in a specific context and the inability
to use those considerations actually to guide conduct. An agent who lacks
these abilities for any nonculpable reason has a rationality defect. Such
explanations make sense of the commonsense claim that defendants
could not control themselves. Indeed, I have no problem calling this
standard a control standard as long as one understands clearly that the
problem that undermines self-control is a cognitive defect and not some
overwhelming force or the like. The rationality standard is a genuine
and limiting condition of nonresponsibility rather than a metaphoric
ground. It can be applied workably and fairly and leaves room for moral,
political, and legal debate about the appropriate limits on responsibility.
If we consider the legal and moral standards of responsibility, it is
clear that the capacity for rationality is the primary criterion. Only lack
of rational capacity can explain the diverse conditions that undermine
responsibility, including, among others, infancy, mental disorder, dementia,
and extreme stress or fatigue. Reflection on the law’s concept of the
person and on the nature of law itself suggests that the capacity for
rationality must be the central criterion. What distinguishes human
beings from the rest of the natural world is that we are endowed with the
capacity for reason—the capacity to use moral and instrumental reasons
to guide our conduct. Law would be powerless to achieve its primary goal
of regulating human interaction if it did not operate through the practical
reason of the agents it addresses and if agents were not capable of
rationally understanding the rules and their application in the various
118. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866–67 (Ala. 1887). As noted supra note
103, one of the first criminal law theoreticians to argue for the necessity of an
independent control test was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the great English criminal law
historian, theorist, judge, and public intellectual. See 2 STEPHEN, supra note 103, at 170–
72. Stephen’s rationale was that self-control difficulties flow from the inability of the
agent to keep long-term consequences in mind and to guide one’s conduct by them. See
id. at 170. Note, however, that this is a classic rationality problem.
119. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 749–52.
120. See id. at 751 & n.16.
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
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circumstances in which agents act. The central reason why an agent
might not be able to be guided by moral and legal expectations is that the
agent may not have been capable of being guided by reason. It is
sufficient if the agent retained the capacity for rationality even if the
capacity was not exercised on the occasion.
The potential capaciousness of the language of all the tests quoted
above suggests that there is a reasonable argument for including
psychopathy as a potential predicate for an insanity plea but almost no
argument for including APD. Nonetheless, American law, either explicitly
by statute or by judicial interpretation, excludes psychopathy as a basis
for an insanity defense. A further provision of the Model Penal Code is
characteristic and instructive. Referring to its insanity defense test quoted
above, it says that “the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.”122 According to the strict language of this provision, neither
psychopaths nor those with APD are excluded from the definition of the
term mental disease or defect because neither is manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.123 Psychopathy, as
clinically described124 and as measured by Hare’s Psychopathy ChecklistRevised,125 includes many psychological criteria and is not manifested
solely by repetitive criminal or antisocial behavior. The criteria for APD
include two psychological variables—lack of remorse and impulsivity.
Only the former is a plausible candidate for an excuse, neither needs to
be present to make the diagnosis, and all of the other criteria are
repetitive criminal or antisocial behaviors.126 One could argue that APD
is not excluded because the diagnostic criteria include a psychological
criterion. On the other hand, because it is not a necessary criterion, perhaps
APD should be excluded. A third possibility would be that APD would
be included only in those cases in which lack of remorse was one of the
diagnostic criteria used, but this criterion alone does not suggest that
people with APD are the equivalent to those with psychopathy. Despite
the logic suggesting that perhaps psychopathy could be the basis of an
insanity defense, the Model Penal Code’s influential provision has been

122. Id. § 4.01(2).
123. This point was recognized by at least one United States court. See United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774, 761–62 (3d Cir. 1961).
124. CLECKLEY, supra note 57, at 337–38.
125. HARE, supra note 57.
126. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 61, at 706.
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interpreted to exclude psychopathy and, a fortiori, APD as a sufficient
mental abnormality to satisfy the insanity defense test.127
Despite U.S. law’s exclusion of psychopathy as a basis for an insanity
defense, the argument for excusing psychopaths, or at least some of
them, is that they lack the strongest reasons for complying with the law,
such as an understanding that what they are doing is wrong and an
empathic understanding of their victim’s plight.128 Most people have the
capacity to use empathy, conscience, understanding of the reason
underlying a criminal law’s prohibition, and prudential reasons to guide
behavior. Psychopaths can be guided only by strictly prudential, entirely
egoistic reasons, such as the fear of being caught and punished. In other
words, they cannot grasp or be guided by the good moral reasons not to
offend, which could be expressed as either a cognitive or control defect.
And according to the same argument, psychopaths with lesser psychopathy
should qualify for mitigation, which is considered virtually entirely at
sentencing in the United States.
In response, most advocates for the continued exclusion of psychopathy
as a basis for the insanity defense argue that it is sufficient for criminal
responsibility if psychopaths can reason prudentially about their own
self-interest.129 First, psychopathy does not prevent agents from acting
as the law defines action, nor does it prevent psychopaths from forming
prohibited mental states. For example, a psychopath who kills another
human being intentionally fully meets the elements of the prima facie
case for murder. Further, psychopaths are not excused because they do
possess many rational capacities. They usually know the facts and are
generally in touch with reality, they understand that there are rules and
consequences for violating them, which they treat as a “pricing” system,
and they feel pleasure and pain, the anticipation of which can potentially
guide their conduct. This is a relatively thin, prudential conception of
rational capacity, but the law deems it sufficient to justify punishment on
desert and deterrence grounds. Finally, psychopaths do not suffer from
lack of self-control as it is traditionally understood. They do not act in
response to desires or impulses that are subjectively experienced as
127. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt., at 176–77 (1962).
128. Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and
Rational Self-Governance, 39 R UTGERS L.J. 349, 350 (2008); Stephen J. Morse,
Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility, 1 NEUROETHICS 205, 208–09 (2008), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/9534141h38470r30/fulltext.pdf.
129. Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on
Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67 I ND . L.J. 719, 746–47 (1992). For an
intermediate position, see Walter Glannon, Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath,
1 NEUROETHICS 158, 158–59 (2008), which argues that psychopaths are capable of
instrumental reasoning and are capable of being guided by moral considerations to some
degree, but their cognitive and affective impairments warrant mitigation.
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overwhelming, uncontrollable, or irresistible. Proponents of holding
psychopaths responsible argue that there is no need to excuse according
to either a desert or deterrence justification for punishment. In short, the
law should view the psychopath as bad and not as mad.
Criminal defendants with major mental disorders, such as schizophrenia,
also do not qualify for the insanity defense if the defendants know that
what they are doing is criminal or wrong. Consequently, there is even
less reason to excuse the psychopath who knows the rules, as virtually
all do, because the psychopath is in touch with reality. Moreover, even
if defendants with a major mental disorder know technically that what
they are doing is against the law, they may not, unlike the psychopath,
even retain substantial prudential reasoning ability. In contrast, psychopaths
always know that the rule applies to them. Defendants who are grossly
out of touch with reality and delusionally believe that they are doing the
right thing, such as God’s will, are paradoxically the mirror image of
psychopaths. Their general capacity for moral reasoning remains intact,
but their psychotic reasons for action undermine the potential of the
rules to guide them prudentially.
Suppose one accepts on normative grounds, as so many do, that the
capacity for prudential reasoning is sufficient for criminal responsibility.
There remains one final argument for excusing at least extreme psychopaths
based on their lack of even prudential reasoning ability. According to
one plausible but controversial, broad characterization of psychopathy,
most ably advanced by Paul Litton, psychopaths are not rational at
all because they lack any evaluative standards to assess and guide
their conduct.130 They do not even possess evaluative standards related
to the pursuit of excitement and pleasure. Psychopaths, Litton argues,
are like Frankfurt’s concept of the “wanton.”131 They do not feel regret,
remorse, shame, or guilt—feelings that are typically experienced in
reaction to our failure to meet the standards we have set for ourselves.
They may feel frustration or anger if they fail to get what they want, but
these are not reactive emotions. Such frustration or anger does not entail
negative self-evaluation. Moreover, severe psychopaths are out of touch
with ordinary social reality. They say that they have goals but act in
ways inconsistent with an understanding of what having and achieving a
130. Litton, supra note 128, at 350–51, 375–77. The argument in the text follows
Litton.
131. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68
J. PHIL. 5, 11, 19–20 (1971).
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goal entails. They do not consistently follow life plans and are impulsive.
Litton concludes that “[i]t is not surprising that agents with a very weak
capacity for internalizing standards act on unevaluated whims and
impulses.”132 Much of their conduct appears unintelligible because we
cannot imagine what good reason would motivate it. In brief, psychopaths
have a generally diminished capacity for rational self-governance that is
not limited to the sphere of morality. They cannot even reason prudentially.
Again, it is possible that future research may convince legislatures or
courts to accept such an understanding of some psychopaths and to extend
the insanity defense to them, but this is not the current law, even for such
extreme cases.
Suppose the insanity defense were extended to psychopaths. In all
jurisdictions, commitment of people who have been acquitted by insanity is
automatic in one form or another, although subject to periodic review.133
Because these commitments are triggered ab initio by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of a criminal offense—if the defendant is able to cast
doubt on the prima facie case, there is no need to raise the insanity defense
—they are considered distinguishable from ordinary civil commitment,
which does not require any criminal act for incarceration. Thus, more
onerous conditions may be imposed on the person committed. The
Supreme Court held in Jones v. United States that both mandatory initial
commitment and indefinite confinement of such people are constitutional.134
The reasoning behind the holding was the commonsense view that it is
presumed that the mental disorder and dangerousness of people acquitted by
reason of insanity will continue. Therefore, public safety requires
commitment if the person remains mentally disordered and dangerous.
In a later opinion, the Court made clear that an insanity acquittee had to
be released from commitment if the person were either no longer
mentally disordered or no longer dangerous.135 The reasoning for the

132.
133.

Litton, supra note 128, at 382.
JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 169–70 (2009).
134. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983).
135. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). Justice O’Connor partially and
cryptically concurred. She noted that an insanity acquittee had been found to have
committed the prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt. She then wrote obscurely, as
follows:
It might therefore be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity
acquittee who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature
and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety
concerns related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness. . . . [A]cquittees
could not be confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for
doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between the nature and
purposes of confinement would be absent.
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latter decision was straightforward. If the person were no longer suffering
from a disorder, there would be no disease justification for preventive
detention. If the person were no longer dangerous, even if still suffering
from disorder, the public safety rationale for preventive detention would
not be satisfied. But as Jones made clear, if mental disorder and
dangerousness were to continue, there would be no constitutional limit
on the length of these commitments. In short, post-insanity acquittal
commitment would seem an excellent means to incapacitate psychopathic
offenders.
Despite the initial attractiveness of this solution to the danger
psychopaths present, there is nevertheless a major practical objection.
The insanity defense cannot be imposed on a competent defendant who
does not wish to raise it,136 and virtually no psychopath would then raise
the insanity defense. At present, there is no effective treatment for adult
psychopaths, so any psychopath acquitted by reason of insanity would
be facing a lifelong commitment to an essentially prison-like facility.137
In contrast, except for crimes carrying the possibility of the death penalty or
Id. at 87–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor also noted
that the seriousness of the crime should also affect whether the state’s interest in
continued confinement would be strong enough. See id. at 88.
If the subject is no longer mentally disordered and therefore no longer nonresponsible,
it is hard to imagine what possible “medical justification” there could be for continuing
civil commitment to protect the public. It is not clear from the O’Connor concurrence if
she would require some finding of mental abnormality, as did the statute upheld in
Kansas v. Hendricks, see 521 U.S. 346, 352, 371 (1997), to make the commitment
analogous to traditional civil commitment. If not, however, then five Justices of the
Supreme Court, the four Foucha dissenters and Justice O’Connor, would have been
willing to countenance pure preventive detention, at least of a person who had committed
a crime without being responsible and who continued to be dangerous.
For an attempt to apply Justice O’Connor’s suggestion, see State v. Randall, 532
N.W.2d 94, 107–09 (Wis. 1995), which permitted continued confinement if there was a
medical justification and the subject was still dangerous, but which limited the term to
the maximum sentence for the crime charged. Needless to say, I believe that this
practice is simply criminal punishment by other means. The “medical justification”
criterion is a transparent and fraudulent attempt to bring this type of commitment within
the disease justification for preemptive confinement. The limitation on the term of the
commitment to the maximum term for the crime charged is simply a salve to the
legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is punitive.
136. E.g., United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
137. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 269. There has been at least one quite
promising treatment program for adolescent psychopaths that seemed overall cost
effective. See Michael Caldwell et al., Treatment Response of Adolescent Offenders with
Psychopathy Features: A 2-Year Follow-Up, 33 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 571, 589–90, 592
(2006). I am not aware of any comparable programs with adults, and the potential
generalizability of this program to adults may be limited because it is an open question
whether psychopathy is a valid diagnosis for juveniles.
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life without possibility of parole, the defendant would be much more
sensible to arrange a favorable plea bargain for a lesser term of years or
to face conviction and imprisonment for the maximum term the law
permits for the crime charged, which would be shorter than the potential
commitment. Even in cases involving the potential for life without
possibility of parole, a plea bargain to a lesser charge or sentence would
be preferable. Moreover, a conviction and the imposition of life without
the possibility of parole might be successfully appealed, whereas the
only hope for release from an indefinite involuntary commitment would
be the discovery of a successful treatment for psychopathy or the hope
that the hospital would release the psychopath when he or she would
clearly have “aged out” of dangerousness.
In short, even if American law came to the conclusion that psychopaths
should be excused, few psychopaths would be willing to accept such
“lenient” treatment, and we would still have to rely on a pure criminal
justice response. Finally, the potential use of post-insanity acquittal would
not apply to offenders with APD or other dangerous offenders. There
simply is no credible argument that such offenders are not criminally
responsible unless they also suffer from some comorbid disorder that
does negate responsibility.
VI. BYPASSING DESERT/DISEASE JURISPRUDENCE: PURE
PREVENTIVE DETENTION FOR DANGEROUSNESS
Rather than artificially expanding our concepts of desert and disease
to fill the gap that dangerous, responsible, and currently unpunishable
people present, many would like to move to a more honest, outright
scheme of pure preventive detention solely for dangerousness. Some might
treat pure preventive detention within the criminal justice system based
on the claim that many of our seemingly retrospective, nonconsequential
practices, such as holding others responsible, can in fact be justified by a
fully prospective, consequential theory.138 Or they might retain a more
robust version of blame but use conviction as a trigger for preventive

138. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL
WORTH WANTING 153–72 (1984). This alternative view recognizes that evolution has
designed us to be intentional, self-conscious creatures, but practices such as holding
others responsible are allegedly simply stimuli that increase the probability of safe
(good) behavior and decrease the probability of dangerous (bad) behavior. No one, in
other words, is “really” responsible. In the words of H.L.A Hart, it is an “economy of
threats.” HART, supra note 112, at 43–44. The economy-of-threats approach does not
successfully explain our practices, however, and suffers from defects of its own. Nothing in
this approach would prohibit blaming and punishing innocent people if doing so would
maximize the good. This is a familiar criticism but one that has no answer if it is unjust
to intentionally punish the innocent, as virtually all theories of justice hold.
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measures in addition to or instead of the proper sentence for the crime.139
A third would treat sentences as based purely on prevention.140 A related
alternative would be a purely civil form of pure preventive detention
imposed after the offender’s prison term has ended, as Professor Paul
Robinson has proposed.141 The most radical proposal, which I think is
entailed by some who argue for a fully consequential criminal justice
system, would be to deny that anyone is ever genuinely responsible, to
completely abandon the criminal/civil, desert/disease distinctions, and to
move to a pure prediction and prevention system of public protection.142
Such proposals are surely coherent and many would be constitutional.
I shall argue, however, that they suffer from serious theoretical and practical
139. This approach is common in Europe. See generally M. v. Germany, App. No.
19359/04, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/Homepage_
EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “Decisions and Judgments” hyperlink;
then follow the “HUDOC database” hyperlink and locate case by citation) (describing
these statutory provisions in various nations); Norwegian General Civil Code, § 39.c,
available at http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf.
140. This is how I interpret Christopher Slobogin’s interesting proposal. See
generally Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The
Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1127 (2011) (arguing that once a person is convicted of an offense, the sentence should
be determined based on back-end decisionmaking by recidivism reduction experts and
should fall within a broad range pronounced by lawmakers).
141. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001). Professor Robinson
agrees that various criminal justice methods that substantially enhance criminal
incarceration, such as habitual offender laws, are being used improperly to fill the gap.
Id. at 1435–36. He affirms that such methods are a form of pure preventive detention
because such enhanced prison terms are disproportionate to the offender’s desert. See id.
Professor Robinson proposes that rather than “cloaking” preventive detention in the
guise of criminal punishment, social safety and respect for criminal law would be better
served if the law straightforwardly segregated proportionate punishment and preventive
detention and adopted postconviction civil commitment based solely on dangerousness.
Id. at 1444–46. He claims that using civil commitment to protect society in the
segregated system would provide more checks on unjustified loss to liberty than would
using the criminal justice system to impose disproportionate sentences. Id. at 1452–55.
It is not clear if such commitments would be constitutional because the Supreme Court
has often reiterated that we do not incarcerate for dangerousness alone, but I will assume
for the sake of argument that such commitments could be justified constitutionally under
limited circumstances.
142. See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience
Changes Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN 207, 217–18 (Semir Zeki
& Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). If no one is genuinely responsible, what is the point
of a criminal/civil distinction? Thus, Greene and Cohen should not concede that
“punishment” practices will need to be continued because punishment for acting agents
is intimately tied to blame, which is predicated on responsibility. The logic of their
argument entails a pure prediction/prevention social control mechanism.
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defects, although some of the latter may be remedied by scientific
advances. Rather than treat all these variants individually, I shall
raise considerations that apply with variable force to all of them.
If an agent is responsible—and by definition the agent is responsible
in all except the radical proposal—then pure preventive detention fails to
treat the person as an autonomous moral agent who can be guided by
reason. People have an undoubted right not to be harmed unjustifiably,
and we can certainly blame and punish those who intentionally commit
such harms, but pure preventive detention treats the agent as a wild beast
who is not governed by reason and who must be objectified and
controlled.143 No matter how dangerous agents may be, it is a massive
infringement on their liberty and autonomy to institute pure preventive
detention for responsible agents. I concede that responsible agents who
know that this may happen can use such knowledge to guide their
behavior to avoid wrongdoing and thus they are responsible for the pure
preventive detention that might be imposed. The implication of this
concession, however, comes very close to the proposal to criminalize the
omission to take steps to prevent one’s own wrongdoing, and as we have
seen, that proposal has problems of its own. We would all be safer, I
suppose, if everyone were constantly monitored in proportion to the threat
they posed, whether or not they had committed a crime, but this would
be an authoritarian regime that failed to respect people as moral agents.
I do not wish to live in such a world. In the interests of respect for the
liberty and autonomy of responsible agents, I am willing to take substantial
risks. This is especially the case given the practical problems with such
schemes that I discuss below.
Relatedly, the proposals omit the attitudinal aspect of blaming that is
central to our self-conception and moral and legal practices.144 To hold
an agent responsible and to blame that agent is not simply a behavioral
disposition, whose purpose is the maximization of some future good.
Blaming fundamentally expresses retrospective disapproval and respect
for persons. Even if it has the good consequence of decreasing future
harmdoing, our current practice is undeniably focused in large measure
143. I recognize that the state has an uncontroversial right to quarantine innocent,
responsible agents if such agents have communicable diseases and no less intrusive
intervention will prevent infection of others. Although many forms of communicable
disease can be spread by conduct, the justification of pure quarantine requires no action
or potential action. It is a purely public health measure directed toward microorganisms
that has the undesirable effect of limiting freedom of action. I address only the
preemption of dangerous intentional conduct. See generally Michael Corrado,
Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 10–11
(1996) (distinguishing punishment and discussing how those “who are presently of a
mind to infect others” may be detained as punishment but not those “who will
voluntarily harm in the future but do not presently intend to do so”).
144. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 55–58 (1994).
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on past events.145 In sum, many of our most important moral and political
concepts depend on taking people seriously as people, as practical
reasoners and potentially moral agents.
To the extent that pure preventive detention is not based on blame and
does not express condemnation, one wonders why a conviction or any
dangerous behavior should be a necessary triggering event except
epistemically. Suppose we could predict future violent conduct with
equal accuracy with or without a triggering dangerous action. Once we
have decided that it is justifiable to deny the liberty and autonomy of
responsible agents if they are sufficiently dangerous, what is the theoretical
basis for not taking intrusive preventive action in any case in which the
danger is sufficient and can be properly demonstrated? As our ability to
predict becomes more sophisticated, as it surely will, what we now
consider bedrock civil liberties will be threatened. Further, if preventive
detention is not deserved punishment because it is not being imposed for
blameworthy conduct, then the state arguably would be morally bound
to compensate for the restraint of liberty and autonomy by making the
conditions of confinement—or other restraints—sufficiently positive. In
other words, a regime of “funishment” would be morally required.146
The practical problems at present would be enormous. Even with
high-risk people and especially for the low base rate, seriously violent
conduct that most concerns us, highly accurate predictions would be
difficult and false positives would be a particular problem. For most of
the people preventively detained, there would be few validated treatment
methods and little incentive to fund them in times of budgetary constraints,
even if the state has the duty to do so.147 If there is genuine periodic
145. Finally, the economy-of-threats approach makes the world entirely too “safe
for determinism.” Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal
and Conceptual Review, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE 329, 348 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
The determinist anxieties that seem inevitably to arise cannot be banished so easily
without doing violence to our conceptual concerns. A full, satisfying account of
responsibility and blaming, paradoxically, should be subject to anxieties about
determinism.
146. See Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical
Reductio, 30 LAW & PHIL. 353, 355 (2011). Smilansky’s argument is directed at hard
determinists, but it is a fortiori directed at any scheme that deprives people of liberty and
autonomy in the absence of blame. See id. I leave the perverse incentives this would
create to the reader’s imagination.
147. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323–24 (1982). In the course of
holding that a developmentally disabled inmate of a state hospital has a right to
habilitation and training for limited purposes, the state’s professional would have a goodfaith immunity defense to a claim for damages if budgetary constraints prevented the
professional from providing the otherwise required training. Id. at 323.
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review, as there constitutionally should be, then the problem of the
difference between the context of the prediction (the institution) and the
context of the outcome (the community) arises. Finally, the “gatekeeper”
problem has already been discussed. The incentives for decisionmakers
will inevitably lead to “conservative” judgments that would only
compound the technological problem of false positives’ predominating.
Thus, I strongly doubt that periodic review of preventive detention on
the ground of dangerousness alone would lead to earlier release rather
than enhanced prison terms.
Let me conclude with a few words about the radical proposal that no
one is really responsible for any behavior and therefore we should move
to a prediction/prevention regime for social control of dangerous agents.
This proposal can be made in nonreductive or reductive form. In the
former, exemplified by Daniel Dennett, our mental states do play a
causal role in explaining our behavior, but people are nonetheless not
responsible. This is simply a version of the alleged incompatibility of
determinism and the potential for responsibility, even if we are the kinds
of agents who act for reasons. If it is not just to say to harmdoers that
they should not have done it, however, what is the source of normativity
for imposing “shoulds”?148 The reductive version seems to suggest, as
Greene and Cohen do, that we are just victims of neuronal circumstances.
If so, we are not the kind of creatures who could conceivably be
responsible because our mental states are not really explanatory at all
but at most illusions the brain creates to make sense of what the brain
has already done. If that is true, which the science does not remotely
prove today,149 then it is not clear what reason people have to do
anything. It is normatively inert and certainly does not entail
consequentialism.
VII. CONCLUSION: PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND FUTURE SCIENCE
The law already allows pure preventive detention in a wide variety of
contexts, but they are virtually all limited in temporal scope and borrow
from desert/disease jurisprudence to some extent. Denial of bail on
grounds of dangerousness is an excellent example, but the accused is
brought to trial relatively quickly, and the incarceration is justified by
probable cause to believe that the accused has culpably committed a
criminal offense. Suppose, however, that society could identify an
148. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 271 n.34
(2008).
149. See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two
Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 19–34
(2008); Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 529, 543–54 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
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identifiable class of people, say those with certain recidivist records or
patterns of childhood misconduct, for whom a subset could be predicted,
with great accuracy, to commit very violent acts unless they were
incapacitated or otherwise treated. Would society be justified in
screening people in that class and purely preventively intervening for
those predicted to be violent if the person were responsible and no
criminal punishment were justified at the time? The argument in favor
would be that although desert/disease jurisprudence protects liberty and
autonomy interests that we cherish and that are constitutionally protected,
no individual right, including those protected specifically by the
Constitution, is absolute. Any might yield in the face of a sufficiently
compelling state interest.
Preventing serious violence is certainly a compelling state interest.
I suspect that the political and constitutional acceptability of the
screening of limited classes followed by preventive intervention would
depend entirely on the accuracy of the screening and predictive methods.
If the classes screened were strictly limited by clear criteria and the
predictions were exceptionally accurate—very few false positives—and
especially if there were nonincapacitative, nonintrusive successful
interventions possible, I expect that such screening and preventive
detention would be upheld.
Despite vast amounts of research, the ability to accurately predict
serious violence over considerable time periods is limited at present.
But if we ever reach the exceptional levels of accuracy just described,
increased abandonment of desert/disease jurisprudence could result.
Although predictability does not mean nonresponsibility, the lure of
accurate social engineering may be irresistible. Important protections
for liberty and autonomy may hang by a technological thread. For now,
however, desert/disease jurisprudence remains the template for thinking
about how society may protect itself consistent with human rights. The
cost of such protection, however, is reduced public safety. Such tradeoffs
are inevitable in a free society that believes that liberty is worth substantial
costs. The best hope for the future is that we discover preventive,
nonintrusive techniques that will lower the risk of violent offenses for
everyone and nonintrusive interventions that will reduce the risk of
recidivism for offenders.
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